mobile-security

Mobile Game Security

Overview

This skill covers mobile security resources from the awesome-game-security collection, focusing on Android and iOS game security research, reverse engineering, and protection bypass techniques.

Mobile behavior is strongly version-, OEM-, entitlement-, signing-, kernel-, and policy-dependent. Verify the exact device/build and use research-rigor before treating a root, hook, emulator, or integrity signal as attribution.

README Coverage

• Cheat > Magisk
• Cheat > Xposed
• Cheat > Frida
• Cheat > Hook ART(android)
• Cheat > Hook syscall(android)
• Cheat > Android Terminal Emulator
• Cheat > Android File Explorer
• Cheat > Android Memory Explorer
• Cheat > Android Application CVE
• Cheat > Android Kernel CVE
• Cheat > Android Bootloader Bypass
• Cheat > IoT / Smart devices
• Cheat > Android ROM
• Cheat > Android Device Trees
• Cheat > Android Kernel Source
• Cheat > Android Root
• Cheat > Android Kernel driver development
• Cheat > Android Kernel Explorer
• Cheat > Android Kernel Driver
• Cheat > Android Network Explorer
• Cheat > Android memory loading
• Cheat > IOS jailbreak
• Cheat > IOS Memory Explorer
• Cheat > IOS File Explorer
• Cheat > IOS App Packaging
• Cheat > Injection:Android
• Cheat > Injection:IOS
• Anti Cheat > Detection:Android root
• Anti Cheat > Detection:Magisk
• Anti Cheat > Detection:Frida
• Some Tricks > Android
• Android Emulator
• IOS Emulator

Android Security

APK Analysis

Tools

• apktool: Decompile/recompile APKs
• jadx: DEX to Java decompiler
• APKiD: Identify packers/protectors
• Frida: Dynamic instrumentation
• APKLab: VS Code integration

Workflow

# Decompile APK
apktool d game.apk

# Analyze DEX files
jadx -d output game.apk

# Identify protection
apkid game.apk

Native Library Analysis

IL2CPP Games (Unity)

1. Extract libil2cpp.so from APK
2. Use IL2CPP Dumper to generate headers
3. Analyze with IDA/Ghidra
4. Hook using Frida or native hooks

Native Games

1. Identify target libraries (.so files)
2. Analyze with reverse engineering tools
3. Pattern scan for functions
4. Apply hooks/patches

Memory Manipulation

Tools

• GameGuardian: Memory editor
• Cheat Engine (ceserver): Remote debugging
• Custom memory tools: Direct /proc/pid/mem access

Access Methods

// Via /proc filesystem
int fd = open("/proc/pid/mem", O_RDWR);
pread64(fd, buffer, size, address);
pwrite64(fd, buffer, size, address);

Hooking Frameworks

Frida

// Basic function hook
Interceptor.attach(Module.findExportByName("libgame.so", "function_name"), {
    onEnter: function(args) {
        console.log("Called with: " + args[0]);
    },
    onLeave: function(retval) {
        retval.replace(0);
    }
});

Native Hooks

• Substrate: Inline hooking framework
• And64InlineHook: ARM64 inline hooks
• xHook: PLT hook library
• Dobby: Multi-platform hook framework

Modern Root Solutions

KernelSU

- Kernel-based root solution, works at kernel level (no /system modification)
- Module system compatible with Magisk modules via KSU module API
- Stealth advantage: no su binary on filesystem, harder to detect
- Requires custom kernel or GKI (Generic Kernel Image) patching
- APatch: newer alternative, patches boot.img with KernelPatch

APatch

- Patches Android kernel at boot via KernelPatch
- No need for custom kernel source (works on stock GKI kernels)
- Module support similar to Magisk/KernelSU
- Root process runs within kernel context

Root Solution Comparison

| Solution  | Level       | Stealth | GKI Support | Module System |
|-----------|-------------|---------|-------------|---------------|
| Magisk    | User/Init   | Medium  | Yes         | Mature        |
| KernelSU  | Kernel      | High    | Yes         | Growing       |
| APatch    | Kernel      | High    | Yes         | Growing       |

Managed Dynamic Instrumentation on Rooted Android

Methodology (KSU/Magisk module + single binary engine):
- Package injector + loader + agent into one ARM64 binary
  to reduce footprint and version mismatch risk
- Expose a local HTTP RPC control plane (127.0.0.1:<port>) for
  low-latency script management, session listing, and function calls
- Keep boot path safe: do NOT start instrumentation engine in
  post-fs-data/service early stage; use delayed manual start after
  boot_completed to avoid zygote/module startup contention

Injection modes:
- Attach: ptrace into running process, inject bootstrap shellcode,
  resolve libc symbols, dlopen agent, then run JS
- Spawn: zygote-hijack path to pause child at fork and inject before
  app initialization (covers Application.onCreate / class init)
- Watch-SO: eBPF-based dlopen monitor that triggers injection when
  target native library is loaded

Stealth tiers:
- NORMAL: direct RWX patching (fastest, easiest to detect)
- WXSHADOW: shadow-page patching to reduce /proc memory visibility
- RECOMP: function recompile/relocation with minimal inline patch

Operational pattern:
- Lifecycle commands: start/stop/restart/status
- Analysis mode: temporarily disable conflicting zygisk modules,
  reboot, instrument, then restore and reboot back to normal mode
- Troubleshooting-first logging: keep manager and engine logs separate

Root Detection Bypass

Common Checks

- /system/bin/su existence
- /system/xbin/su existence  
- Build.TAGS contains "test-keys"
- ro.build.selinux property
- Magisk files/folders
- Package manager checks

Bypass Methods

• Magisk DenyList / Shamiko: Modern root hiding (replaces MagiskHide)
• LSPosed/EdXposed: Xposed framework hooks
• Frida scripts: Hook detection functions
• APK patching: Remove detection code
• KernelSU SU isolation: Process-level root visibility control

Zygisk Modules

// Zygisk module structure
class Module : public zygisk::ModuleBase {
    void onLoad(zygisk::Api *api, JNIEnv *env) override {
        this->api = api;
        this->env = env;
    }
    
    void preAppSpecialize(zygisk::AppSpecializeArgs *args) override {
        // Before app loads
    }
    
    void postAppSpecialize(const zygisk::AppSpecializeArgs *args) override {
        // After app loads - inject here
    }
};

Android Protections

Common Protectors

• Tencent ACE: Chinese market protection
• AppSealing: Commercial protection
• DexGuard/ProGuard: Obfuscation
• Arxan: Enterprise protection

iOS Security

Analysis Tools

• Hopper: Disassembler
• IDA Pro: Industry standard
• class-dump: Objective-C header extraction
• Frida: Dynamic instrumentation
• Clutch/dumpdecrypted: App decryption

Jailbreak Tools

• H5GG: iOS cheat engine
• Flex: Runtime patching
• Cycript: Runtime manipulation
• ceserver-ios: Cheat Engine for iOS

Hooking (Jailbroken)

// Using Logos (Theos)
%hook TargetClass
- (int)targetMethod:(int)arg {
    int result = %orig;
    return result * 2;  // Modify return
}
%end

Non-Jailbreak Techniques

• Sideloading: Modified IPAs
• Enterprise certificates: Custom signing
• AltStore: Self-signing tool

Unity Mobile Games

IL2CPP Analysis

1. Locate libil2cpp.so (Android) or UnityFramework (iOS)
2. Find global-metadata.dat
3. Run IL2CPPDumper
4. Generate SDK/headers
5. Hook target functions

Mono Analysis

1. Extract managed DLLs
2. Decompile with dnSpy/ILSpy
3. Modify and repackage
4. Or hook at runtime

Common Targets

- Currency/coins values
- Player stats (health, damage)
- Inventory manipulation
- Premium unlocks
- Ad removal

Unreal Mobile Games

Analysis Approach

1. Identify UE version
2. Dump SDK using appropriate tool
3. Locate GObjects, GNames
4. Find target functionality
5. Apply memory patches or hooks

Overlay Rendering (Android)

Surface-Based

// Native surface overlay
ANativeWindow* window = ANativeWindow_fromSurface(env, surface);
// Render using OpenGL ES or Vulkan

ImGui Integration

• Zygisk + ImGui modules
• Surface hijacking
• Direct framebuffer access

Network Analysis

Tools

• mitmproxy: MITM proxy
• Charles Proxy: Traffic analysis
• Frida SSL bypass: Certificate pinning bypass

Certificate Pinning Bypass

// Frida universal SSL bypass
Java.perform(function() {
    var TrustManager = Java.registerClass({
        implements: [X509TrustManager],
        methods: {
            checkClientTrusted: function() {},
            checkServerTrusted: function() {},
            getAcceptedIssuers: function() { return []; }
        }
    });
    // Install custom TrustManager
});

Anti-Cheat on Mobile

Common Systems

• Tencent ACE: Chinese games
• NetEase Protection: NetEase games
• Custom solutions: Per-game implementations

Detection Methods

- Root/jailbreak detection
- Frida detection
- Emulator detection
- Integrity checks
- Debugger detection
- Hook detection

Bypass Strategies

1. Static analysis of detection code
2. Hook detection functions
3. Hide injection footprint
4. Timing attack consideration
5. Clean environment emulation

eBPF-Based Tools

Tracing & Hooking

- stackplz: eBPF-based stack trace tool for Android
- eDBG: eBPF-powered debugger for Android processes
- tracee: Aqua Security's eBPF runtime security tool (Linux/Android)
- eBPF hooking: attach to tracepoints, kprobes, uprobes without kernel module

Advantages Over Traditional Approaches

- No kernel module compilation required (runs in eBPF VM)
- May work on compatible GKI kernels when BPF features, BTF, privileges,
  SELinux policy, lockdown state, and required attach points permit it
- Can avoid a custom kernel module, but progra

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