lindy-security-basics
Security implementation guide for Lindy AI, focusing on API key management, permission scoping, and integration isolation.
Install
mkdir -p .claude/skills/lindy-security-basics && curl -L -o skill.zip "https://agentskills.codes/api/skills/download/4105" && unzip -o skill.zip -d .claude/skills/lindy-security-basics && rm skill.zipInstalls to .claude/skills/lindy-security-basics
Activation
This is the description your AI agent reads to decide when to run this skill — the better it matches your request, the more reliably it fires.
Implement security best practices for Lindy AI agents and integrations.Key capabilities
- →Manage Lindy API keys securely using environment variables or secret managers.
- →Authenticate webhooks by verifying unique secret keys on inbound requests.
- →Scope agent permissions to minimize blast radius by isolating integrations.
- →Limit agent skill surface area by starting with a focused set of skills.
- →Audit agent activity through task history, integration access, and credit anomalies.
How it works
The skill provides instructions for storing API keys, implementing webhook signature verification, isolating integration accounts per agent, and defining security patterns in agent prompts to control data handling.
Inputs & outputs
When to use lindy-security-basics
- →Securely store Lindy API keys
- →Implement secret rotation in CI/CD
- →Audit agent permissions and scopes
- →Isolate integration accounts
About this skill
Lindy Security Basics
Overview
Secure Lindy workflows at the boundaries Lindy currently documents: generated Webhook Received secrets, per-action connected-account selection, target-service authentication in HTTP Request, Ask for Confirmation/draft modes, dedicated Computer Use sessions, Tasks, and Test Panel. Do not rely on an undocumented Lindy API key, webhook signature, role, connection-sharing level, fixed quota, or plan entitlement.
Prerequisites
- Lindy workspace with an editable custom agent
- Inventory of triggers, actions, connected accounts, external endpoints, data classes, owners, and consequential side effects
- Sanitized fixtures and test/sandbox integrations
Instructions
Step 1: Draw the Trust Map
For every path, record source, destination, data fields, credential owner, selected connected account, allowed side effects, approver, failure path, and evidence source. Separate these directions:
| Direction | Supported boundary |
|---|---|
| Application to Lindy | Webhook Received URL + Lindy-generated bearer secret |
| Lindy to external service | HTTP Request + that service's authentication |
| External account action | Exactly the connected account selected on the action |
| Lindy callback to application | Receiver-owned trust boundary; no documented Lindy signature claim |
Step 2: Secure Webhook Received
- Create the webhook inside the Webhook Received trigger.
- Generate the secret, copy it once, and store it in the caller's secret manager.
- Send it only in the Authorization bearer header to the generated HTTPS URL.
- Keep the webhook URL/secret out of prompts, bodies, query strings, task titles, screenshots, logs, and tickets.
- Minimize and validate the caller's payload before transmission.
- Rotate after suspected exposure by creating/reconfiguring the protected boundary, verifying the replacement, and retiring the old value according to the current UI.
The bearer secret authenticates the caller to Lindy. It does not authenticate a callback from Lindy to your application, and Lindy's Webhooks guide does not document an HMAC signature or timestamp header for that callback.
Step 3: Scope Connected Accounts and Actions
Lindy documents that each action selects one connected account. For every action:
- select the account with the minimum data and authority required;
- prefer a dedicated work/test account when the integration supports one;
- remove actions and connections no longer required by the workflow;
- avoid combining broad read and consequential write abilities in an autonomous Agent Step when deterministic actions/conditions are sufficient; and
- use a dedicated Computer for an agent that needs Computer Use so saved sessions and site credentials are not shared across unrelated work.
Do not invent local permission dictionaries or quotas and describe them as Lindy controls. Enforce application-owned authorization again at any external receiver.
Step 4: Put Humans Before Consequential Side Effects
Enable Ask for Confirmation on supported actions that send messages, update records, create events, or cause other consequential effects. Use draft mode where available. Add condition-based escalation for unknown/out-of-scope cases. Keep confirmation enabled until representative testing and review justify a deliberate change; money, contracts, access changes, deletion, and sensitive external communications should retain explicit approval.
Step 5: Minimize Data Across Every Step
- Use stable references instead of full messages/documents where possible.
- Do not pass all webhook headers or the entire body to later actions.
- Send HTTP Request only fields required by the target schema.
- Bound lengths, collection sizes, nesting, and allowed enum values.
- Never print secrets or sensitive inputs in Run Code; stdout becomes
text. - Keep task links restricted because Tasks can expose step inputs and outputs.
- Redact incident/evaluation exports; retain details only in approved systems.
Prompt instructions are defense in depth, not authorization. Conditions, selected accounts, receiver-side checks, confirmation, and schema validation must enforce the boundary even if model output is incorrect or adversarial.
Step 6: Test Fail-Closed Behavior
Use synthetic data and test accounts. Lindy's Test Panel executes real actions. Verify valid flow plus wrong/missing webhook secret, oversized/unknown payload, unexpected outbound host, target 401/403/429/5xx, malformed response, attempted prompt injection, missing approval, and untrusted callback content. Each negative case must stop, quarantine, or request human review without completing its side effect.
Step 7: Review Tasks and Current Account Controls
Use Tasks to inspect the exact step order, selected paths, inputs/outputs, errors, and timestamps after testing and deployment. Review connected accounts and agent actions on a defined owner-approved cadence. For organization identity, audit, compliance, or contractual controls, verify current availability and configuration in Lindy's official security/pricing material and your workspace; do not freeze plan claims in this skill.
Security Checklist
- Trust map covers every inbound, outbound, connected-account, and callback path
- Webhook Received uses the generated bearer secret and exact generated URL
- Secrets are distinct, nonempty, protected, and absent from content/logs
- Every action uses the minimum-authority connected account
- Consequential side effects require confirmation/draft/review
- Payloads and Run Code inputs/outputs have explicit schemas and bounds
- Callback content is untrusted until receiver-owned checks succeed
- Test Panel uses synthetic data and test integrations
- Negative tests prove fail-closed behavior
- Tasks and connection/action inventory have owners and a review cadence
Error Handling
| Issue | Cause | Solution |
|---|---|---|
| Wrong caller reaches webhook | Missing/wrong generated bearer | Reject; rotate if exposure is suspected |
| Agent uses wrong account | Wrong account selected on action | Stop workflow and correct the explicit selection |
| Callback has no trusted auth boundary | Assumed Lindy signature | Quarantine; implement receiver-owned auth without claiming platform signing |
| Sensitive data appears in Tasks/logs | Payload/output too broad | Disable path, redact downstream copies, minimize schema, retest |
| Side effect runs during test | Production connection/no confirmation | Contain impact, restore state, use test account and confirmation |
| External receiver accepts excess authority | Lindy prompt treated as authorization | Enforce identity, schema, and authorization at receiver |
Output
Return a security review containing:
- trust map and data classification for each boundary;
- credential inventory with owner, storage, rotation trigger, and separation proof;
- action-to-connected-account and side-effect inventory;
- confirmation/draft/escalation decisions;
- exact schema/data-minimization controls;
- happy-path and negative fail-closed test receipts; and
- open risks with owner and remediation, without copying secrets or sensitive payloads.
Examples
For an inbound document event, the caller sends only a synthetic document reference to the generated Webhook Received URL using its generated bearer secret. The workflow uses a specifically selected read-only source account, transforms only the reference, and stages any external update behind Ask for Confirmation. A separate application receiver validates its own credential and minimal callback schema; it does not assume an undocumented Lindy signature or act on callback text alone.
Resources
- Webhooks
- HTTP Request
- Actions and account selection
- Human in Loop
- Computer Use
- Test Panel
- Tasks
- Lindy Security
Next Steps
Carry the completed trust map, negative-test receipts, and open risks into
lindy-prod-checklist; production readiness is not proven by this checklist alone.
When not to use it
- →When securing non-Lindy AI integrations.
- →When the agent does not interact with external services or sensitive data.
Prerequisites
Limitations
- →Agent activity auditing requires manual review of task history and integration access.
- →Connection sharing controls vary by sharing level (Private, Team shared, Workspace shared).
- →Enterprise security features like SSO, SCIM, and Audit Logs are only available on the Enterprise plan.
How it compares
This skill offers specific security measures tailored for Lindy AI agents, providing a structured approach to protect against unauthorized access and data exposure, unlike general security guidelines.
Compared to similar skills
lindy-security-basics side by side with the closest alternatives in the catalog.
| Skill | Installs | Updated | Safety | Difficulty |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| lindy-security-basics (this skill) | 1 | 2mo | Caution | Intermediate |
| 1password | 27 | 4mo | Review | Intermediate |
| senior-security | 31 | 9mo | Review | Advanced |
| fix-dependabot-alerts | 18 | 8mo | Review | Intermediate |
Try saying
Example prompts that trigger this skill in your AI assistant.
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